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CORRESPONDENCE 
Article II Revisionism 
Cass R. Sunstein * 
One of the most striking developments of the last decade has been 
the new use of Article II in public law adjudication. Article II is a 
prominent feature not only of cases involving the creation of federal 
institutions that are independent of the President, 1 but also of new 
disputes involving reviewability, scope of review, and standing.2 It is 
especially interesting that some key standing cases, nominally decided 
under Article Ill, have an unambiguous root in a distinctive under-
standing of Article II. 3 Thus it is suggested that certain grants of 
standing - to citizens, taxpayers, or others without an individuated 
injury - would compromise the vesting of executive power in the 
President and the grant of power to the President, rather than to 
courts or to citizens, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."4 Article II appears to be doing much of the crucial work in 
the key Article III cases, and Justice Scalia's powerful dissenting opin-
ion in Morrison v. Olson 5 may be enjoying a surprising rebirth in the 
law of standing. 
All this suggests that Professor Krent and Mr. Shenkman have 
performed a valuable service in spelling out the argument that Article 
II, rather than Article III, justifies constitutional limits on legislative 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and 
Department of Political Science. A.B. 1975, J.D. 1978, Harvard.- Eel. I am grateful to Akhi1 
Amar, Larry Lessig, and David Strauss for helpful co=ents on an earlier draft. 
1. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding appointment of independent 
counsel by judiciary under Ethics in Government Act); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) 
(striking down delegation of executive power to agency subject to Congressional control). 
2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (denying standing in part because it 
is the Chief Executive's, not a citizen's, duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed); 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (noting the similarity between agency's decision not to 
enforce rule and nonreviewable prosecutorial discretion under Article II); Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737 (1984) (denying standing in order to prevent judicial usurpation of Article II executive 
duties); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(stating that, when agency's interpretation of law involves weighing of policy preferences rather 
than determination of agency powers, courts should defer to the agency to avoid encroaching 
upon Article II powers). 
3. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-46; Allen, 468 U.S. at 760-61. 
4. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3. 
5. 487 U.S. 654, 697-733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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grants of standing. 6 Indeed, on several important matters, we are very 
much in agreement. We agree that Article III forbids courts from 
hearing cases in which the plaintiff has no cause of action, but that, 
under Article I, Congress can create causes of action whenever it 
chooses.7 We agree that the citizen suit, while consistent with Article 
Ill, has a mixed record as a matter of simple policy. 8 We agree that 
Article II poses no barrier to suits in cases involving individuated inju-
ries, even when a beneficiary of a regulatory program is seeking 
greater enforcement of the law.9 I also want to emphasize that Krent 
and Shenkman have put their finger on a key but underanalyzed fea-
ture of the recent standing decisions. 
In this brief space, I will be unable fully to come to terms with 
6. Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 1793 (1993). 
7. Id. at 1794-95. 
8. Id. at 1803-04. 
9. Id. at 1805-06. On this score it is illuminating to compare Lujan to the striking decision 
in Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 61 U.S.L.W. 4626 
(U.S. June 14, 1993). Jacksonville had enacted an ordinance requiring that 10% of the money 
spent on city contracts be "set aside" for minority business enterprises. A contractors' associa-
tion, consisting mostly of members who would not qualify as minority enterprises, brought suit, 
claiming that the set-aside violated the Equal Protection Clause. The lower court denied stand-
ing on the ground that no member of the association had demonstrated that, " 'but for the pro-
gram, any AGC member would have bid successfully for any of these contracts.'" 61 U.S.L.W. 
at 4627 (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 951 
F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992)). There was therefore no injucy in fact. 
The Supreme Court responded: 
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group 
to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group 
seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but 
for the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injucy in fact" in an equal protection 
case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the 
barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. And in the context of a challenge to 
a set-aside program, the "injury in fact" is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the 
bidding process, not the loss of a contract. To establish standing, therefore, a party chal-
lenging a set-aside program like Jacksonville's need only demonstrate that it is able and 
ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an 
equal basis. 
61 U.S.L.W. at 4629 (citations omitted). In an intriguing footnote, the Court added, "(i]t follows 
from our definition of 'injury in fact' that petitioner has sufficiently alleged both that the city's 
ordinance is the 'cause' of its injucy and that a judicial decree directing the city to discontinue its 
program would 'redress' the injury." 61 U.S.L.W. at 4629 n.5. 
There is serious tension between Lujan and Associated General Contractors. In Lujan, the 
injucy could have been recharacterized in opportunity-like terms, and, in that event, there would 
have been no problem with injury in fact, causation, or redressability. Indeed, there is real ten-
sion between Associated General Contractors and many of the cases denying standing, including 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), Simon v. EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). For a general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Stand-
ing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries." and Article II/, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 193-95 
(1992). A prime goal of standing doctrine for the next few years should be to explain when 
injuries can be characterized narrowly and when broadly. In my view, the question should turn 
on legislative instructions. See id. at 234-35. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 
SUP. Cr. REV. (forthcoming). 
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their understanding of Article II. I will try, however, to indicate why 
that understanding seems to be quite adventurous as a matter of con-
stitutional history and structure. In the end, I suggest that their con-
ception of Article II amounts to a form of constitutional revisionism, 
in the interest of judgments of policy and fact that are plausible but 
that lack sufficiently clear constitutional roots to be invoked by courts. 
Let me begin with a brief outline of the basic argument. Krent and 
Shenkman contend that Article II reflects a commitment to a unitary 
executive, and that the grant of citizen standing fatally compromises 
that commitment.10 In their view, it is the President who is entrusted 
with the authority to oversee all implementation offederal law.11 This 
idea stems from the constitutional judgment that there should be polit-
ical accountability for the redress of "public harms," that is, harms 
shared by the public as a whole.12 The political process is the appro-
priate, and indeed the exclusive, check on inadequate redress of these 
harms. 13 
To be sure, people with individuated interests can bring suit 
against executive illegality, even if the illegality amounts to insufficient 
enforcement of the law. "Privately accountable relators," however, 
are altogether different. Under Article II, they should not be allowed 
to bring suit against either private defendants acting in violation of the 
law14 or against the executive itself. This principle applies even if 
Congress creates bounties for citizens.15 If citizens lacking individu-
ated interests were permitted to bring suit, they would undermine the 
forms of political accountability that are guaranteed by the system of 
unitariness in execution of the laws. It is for this reason that Article II 
bans the citizen suit. 
This reasoning is indeed an understanding of Article II; but is it an 
understanding with real roots in the Constitution, one that federal 
judges should invoke in order to invalidate federal statutes? I am 
skeptical. First, a conceptual point: Krent and Shenkman lean very 
hard on the distinction between individuated and nonindividuated 
harms. This distinction seems quite problematic to me, not because 
there are hard line-drawing problems - although there are16· - but 
10. Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, at 1794-96. 
11. Id. at 1794. 
12. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text on this distinction. 
13. Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, at 1801-04. 
14. In this respect, Krent and Shenkman answer a question not resolved in Lujan, a question 
that I believe the Court would resolve the other way. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 231-33. 
15. The same comment made supra in note 14 applies here. See id. at 232-33. 
16. Part of the reason lies in the difficulty of deciding how to characterize the harms. See 
supra note 9. 
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because the distinction may not be workable for the purposes to which 
Krent and Shenkman seek to use it. The key point is that we cannot 
decide whether an injury is individuated in the abstract; this determi-
nation depends on whether the law has defined it as individuated. If 
Congress can enact law to decide whether injuries are individuated, it 
may ensure that injuries that were once nonindividuated are now in 
fact individually held, and it may grant standing to individuals to vin-
dicate those interests. 
The point may seem exotic and abstract, but it is perfectly familiar. 
In a system without private property, for example, property is publicly 
owned, and no one can claim that "his" property is at stake. There 
are no individuated ownership rights and hence no individuated 
harms. It is only when the law creates property rights that individu-
ated injuries begin to exist. So, too, there is no individuated right to 
many regulatory benefits, such as clean air, when the law has allowed 
the benefit to be unowned. But once government has (1) created pri-
vate ownership rights or a joint tenancy in the relevant benefit and (2) 
said that these rights may be vindicated in court, the case is quite dif-
ferent. Once the government has created ownership rights, the inter-
est has become individuated in the legally relevant sense. 
Of course there are differences between public and nonpublic 
goods. Perhaps Krent and Shenkman mean to argue that some public 
goods - things owned by all or many - cannot give rise to standing. 
But to some extent the very difference between public and nonpublic 
goods is an artifact of law. Whether a good is public depends at least 
partly on whether the government has said that it can be owned pri-
vately. In any case, I do not think that the differences between public 
and nonpublic goods have constitutional status for purposes of stand-
ing. It is not clear why Congress should be disabled from granting 
each of us a kind of property right in a certain state of affairs - even if 
many or all of us share that right - and from saying that each of us is 
entitled to vindicate that right in court. 
Let me put the conceptual issues to one side and return to the Con-
stitution. As Krent and Shenkman are aware, 17 their understanding of 
Article II has no support in the history of Article II. In fact, early 
constitutional practice strongly argues against this understanding. 18 
Citizen suits were authorized before, during, and shortly after the 
founding, and there is no evidence that anyone thought that they 
17. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons 
from History, 38 AM. U. L. R.Ev. 275, 302 (1989); Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, at 1803 & 
n.38. 
18. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 168-79. 
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raised the slightest question under Article II. Criminal law enforce-
ment by citizens is a well-established device in Anglo-American law.19 
Even if some forms of citizen enforcement of the criminal law might 
be constitutionally troublesome, we are dealing here with civil actions, 
where the historical evidence cuts very hard against the invocation of 
Article II. 
More broadly, I think that the notion of a "unitary executive" 
needs a good deal more elaboration, certainly in terms of its complex 
history. The Framers did believe in a unitary executive; but they did 
not think that this belief entailed the further view that the President is 
in charge of all implementation of the laws. In fact, they allowed Con-
gress considerable power to structure implementation as it saw fit.20 
We know, for example, that in the period after the Founding, much 
prosecution under federal law took place without presidential con-
trol.21 Neither the President nor the Attorney General controlled the 
district attorneys. Citizens could enforce federal law in state court. 
Moreover, both the Comptroller General and the Postmaster were im-
munized from the general control of the President. 
In these circumstances, the alleged constitutional commitment to a 
strongly unitary executive - a president who was to be in charge of 
all of what we now call implementation of the law - seems to me to 
have been greatly oversold. If judges are to be bound by history, or to 
give history a good deal of weight, it is necessary to reject the Article 
II argument against citizen standing. 
I do not contend that the historical evidence is decisive. Perhaps it 
would be possible to develop a structural argument for an exclusive 
presidential role in law implementation.22 Let us suppose that such an 
argument can be made. Even if it can, it does not support the view 
that Article II bans suits brought by people without individuated in-
terests. The key point is that there is no difference between the inter-
ference with that exclusive role in cases in which the plaintiff has an 
individuated interest and the interference with that role when the 
plaintiff has no such interest. 
19. Id. at 175. 
20. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Earlp Vemonr and Prac· 
tices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 234.45 (1989) (discussing Congress' power in establishing 
executive departments); Larry Lessig & Cass R. Sunstcin, 17te President and the Administration. 
93 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. (forthcoming 1993). 
21. In the next few sentences I summarize the argument in Lessig & Sunstcin, supra note 20. 
22. Krent and Shenkman use this strategy. Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, nt 1799-1801. 
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, make a structural argument stressing changed circumstnncci, 
but the argument is too narrow to jeopardize the citizen suit. 
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Imagine, for example, that the plaintiffs in Lujan 23 had purchased 
airline tickets to the areas in which endangered species were at risk. 
In that event, they would unquestionably have had a sufficient "injury 
in fact" to challenge the failure to apply the Endangered Species Act 
extraterritorially. But if they had airline tickets, would they compro-
mise Article II concerns any less? I do not believe so. Along the Arti-
cle II dimension, there is no difference between citizen suits and suits 
by people with individuated interests. If suits against the executive by 
people with individuated interests do not violate Article II - as every-
one. agrees - it is hard to see why the same suits violate Article Il 
merely because of the absence of an individuated interest. 
In any case, it is far from clear that citizen suits really compromise 
any constitutional commitment to presidential exclusivity in imple-
menting the law.24 We should distinguish here between citizen suits 
against private defendants and citizen suits against the government it-
self. If the government is not implicated, we have a civil supplement 
to public enforcement efforts, corresponding to the ordinary and time-
honored parallel systems of public and private law. Tort law and 
criminal law usually work hand in hand, allowing private and public 
suits founded on similar complaints, such as assault, battery, theft, and 
so forth. The creation of a citizen suit against private violators builds 
on this most conventional of models. I do not see how the Constitu-
tion's structural commitments forbid this model. 
Perhaps the citizen suit will interfere a bit with the government's 
overall enforcement scheme by, for example, allowing an action when 
the executive has exercised prosecutorial discretion so as to exempt a 
violator.25 It is not simple, however, to explain how this interference 
would violate Article II, any more than civil actions in state court 
violate state constitutions because such actions interfere with the crim-
inal prosecutor's power to enforce the criminal law. Because the gov-
ernment is not a party, I cannot see why the citizen suit against private 
defendants creates a problem under Article II, especially if, as noted, 
an identical suit from someone with an individuated interest does not 
create any such problem. The disruption of the President's law en-
forcement authority is the same in either case. This point suggests 
that we are back to Article III and that Article II is irrelevant after all. 
23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
24. See Frank H. Easterbrook Unitary Executil'e Interpretation: A Comment. IS CARoozo 
L REv. (forthcoming 1993) ("Litigation on bchnlf of the polily is shared \\ith privale citizens in 
the United Kingdom and many states (which even today allow private prosecution), and the 
survival of qui tam actions, veterans of the eighteenth cennuy, shows thn! litigation hlls never 
been a prerogative confined to executive officlnls. "). 
25. See Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, at 1803. 
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The issue is somewhat different in suits brought by citizens against 
the government. Perhaps there is an Article II problem if a court says 
that the executive must act in a certain class of cases. To come to 
terms with this claim, it is necessary to see what exactly the court will 
decide and what will be at stake. If the citizen suit is to go forward, 
the question for judicial decision is whether the relevant agency has 
violated federal law in circumstances in which the law dictates action 
of a certain kind. The court has no authority to issue a judgment be-
cause of a policy disagreement; it must find illegality.26 If the agency 
has violated the law, the court will so hold and issue an appropriate 
decree. The question is this: Why, precisely, do such suits raise an 
Article II issue? 
The problem does not arise under the "Take Care" Clause. By 
hypothesis, the President will win in court if he has "taken care" and 
lose only if he violated that duty. It is not so easy to see why the 
"Take Care" Clause forbids courts from ordering the President to 
carry out the law. Indeed, Krent and Shenkman do not really believe 
that the clause forbids courts from doing this. They believe that, when 
an individuated injury is at stake, a decree to this effect raises no Arti-
cle II problem. 27 Again: if Article II allows courts to interfere with 
law implementation by ordering the President to "take care" at the 
behest of a plaintiff with an individuated injury, why does Article II 
offer a freestanding objection to such an order at the behest of a citi-
zen? No good reason comes to mind. 
If this reasoning is right, the vesting of executive power in the 
President seems to add nothing to the problem raised by citizen suits. 
This clause does not bar the courts from issuing decrees calling for the 
legally required enforcement of the law at the behest of people with 
individuated injuries. If it does not, it is unclear how the clause sup-
plies a barrier when citizens bring suit. Of course, the distinction be-
tween individuated and nonindividuated injuries grows out of Article 
III cases, in which it is understandable if misguided (as Krent and 
Shenkman agree28). The unanswered question remains why that dis-
tinction is crucial for purposes of Article II. Perhaps the response is 
that the President should be accountable only to the public as a whole 
when individuals are not peculiarly affected, and when any particular 
litigant stands basically for everyone. This position is fully under-
26. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), the agency receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts. 
27. Krent & Shenkman, supra note 6, at 1816-17. 
28. See id. at 1806-07. 
138 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:131 
standable as a matter of policy, but it does not seem to be more than 
that. 
In the end, the structural claim at issue here amounts to a proposi-
tion that the abstract interest in political accountability, grounded in 
Article II, forbids Congress from allowing citizens to sue either private 
people acting in violation of the law or executive officials who are de-
faulting on their legal obligations. This claim raises many puzzles. If 
we are concerned about political accountability, the argument seems 
strained. It is after all Congress, the national lawmaker, that has by 
hypothesis decided in favor of citizen suits, and Congress is accounta-
ble for its actions. Moreover, there is at the very least an apparent 
democratic failure whenever a bureaucracy fails to do what Congress 
has prescribed. Surely Congress could conclude that the citizen suit 
provides both an ex ante deterrent and an ex post corrective to this 
unfortunate result. For these reasons, it seems a bit mysterious to say 
that the interest in political accountability forbids Congress from 
granting citizens standing to supplement or to correct agency illegality 
in enforcement. 
One final point. As the last generation of constitutional law has 
made clear, there is a thin line between structural arguments having a 
genuine constitutional source and policy judgments belonging in the 
political process. If judges are going to strike down enactments of 
Congress on constitutional grounds, they should be reasonably confi-
dent that a real constitutional commitment underlies this result, and 
that the commitment does not mask instead a controversial set of pol-
icy recommendations. The aggressive use of Article II to prevent 
Congress from creating citizen suits seems to run afoul of this princi-
ple. It is not as if the claim has absolutely no connection to something 
in the Constitution; but the connection is much too attenuated to jus-
tify invalidation of federal statutes. This is my basic reaction to the 
imaginative recent use of Article II in the law reviews and the 
Supreme Court. 
